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Background: A global budgeting system helps control the growth of healthcare spending by setting expenditure
ceilings. However, the hospital global budget implemented in Taiwan in 2002 included a special provision: drug
expenditures are reimbursed at face value, while other expenditures are subject to discounting. That gives hos-
pitals, particularly those that are for-profit, an incentive to increase drug expenditures in treating patients.
Methods: We calculated monthly drug expenditures by hospital departments from January 1997 to June 2006,
using a sample of 348 193 patient claims to Taiwan National Health Insurance. To allow for variation among
responses by departments with differing reliance on drugs and among hospitals of different ownerships, we
used quantile regression to identify the effect of the hospital global budget on drug expenditures.
Results: Although drug expenditure increased in all hospital departments after the enactment of the hospital
global budget, departments in for-profit hospitals that rely more heavily on drug treatments increased drug
spending more, relative to public hospitals.
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that a global budgeting system with special reimbursement provisions for
certain treatment categories may alter treatment decisions and may undermine cost-containment goals, par-
ticularly among for-profit hospitals.
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Introduction
A global budget is ‘an overall spending target or limit that con-
strains the price and the quality of the services provided’.1As
such, it is a method to control aggregate spending on healthcare
and therefore a method by which a society can choose how much
to spend on healthcare and how healthcare spending will increase
over time.2,3 Global budgeting systems are widely used in a
number of countries, including England, France, Germany,
Canada and Taiwan. In the USA, the Veterans Administration
budget functions as a type of global budget.4–7 Ideally, a global
budget system also encourages healthcare professionals to use
their expertise to allocate medical resources. However, the incen-
tives created by a global budget may cause providers, particularly
for-profit ones, to alter the quantity or quality of care provided to
patients in ways that maximize profit, thus undermining cost
control and potentially affecting important healthcare decisions.
In this paper we examine whether the effect of the global
budget implemented by Taiwan on hospital drug expenditure
varies among hospitals with different types of ownership.
In March 1995 Taiwan enacted National Health Insurance
(NHI) to provide universal and comprehensive coverage.8 At
first, healthcare providers were reimbursed on a traditional
fee-for-service (FFS) basis, but, in anticipation of rising costs, the
NHI Act specifically called for the adoption of global budgeting.
Taiwan has gradually imposed global budgets on each different
healthcare sector covered by NHI (dental services, traditional out-
patient Chinese medical services, Western-based medical clinics,
and hospitals providing Western-based inpatient and outpatient
medical care). Hospitals providing care based on Western medi-
cine were shifted to a global budget on 1 July 2002.
The global budget that Taiwan adopted for these hospitals has
two important features. First, the budget is a ‘hard’ cap9 set at the
regional level; that is, a fixed sum is allocated to each of six regions
to cover inpatient and outpatient expenditures by all hospitals in
that region. Unlike a global budget with a ‘soft’ cap, which can
be exceeded if need be, the hard cap global budgets in Taiwan
are fixed ‘ex ante’ (before the event) and are reconciled with the
actual volume of services provided by adjusting the rate for
each unit of medical service, known as the point value, ‘ex post’
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(after the event).10 That is, although technically providers con-
tinue to be reimbursed on a FFS basis, the fees are uncertain
ex ante because the point value for a unit of service is discounted
if necessary to ensure that total regional expenditures do not
exceed the global budget. Hospitals within each region thus
compete for shares of the budget by competing for patients,
and each hospital has an individual incentive to increase services
so as to win a greater share of the global budget, even though col-
lectively this response causes the point value to decline.6
The second important feature is that the hospitals are reim-
bursed differently for drug expenditures and for spending on
other services. Expenditures on drugs are reimbursed from the
global budget at their ex ante point value, before the ex post
point value used to reimburse non-drug services is calculated.10
That is, unlike reimbursements for non-drug services, reimburse-
ments for drugs are not discounted to meet the global budget
target. Drug expenditures therefore represent a risk-free and
usually profitable flow of income for hospitals, giving them an in-
centive to treat patients with drugs rather that provide other types
of care.6
The Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) adopted several
strategies to monitor drug use both before and after enacting the
global budget, including developing drug use guidelines, auditing
more claims, and instituting provider profiling (comparing costs
and prescribing patterns among peer providers) and utilization
review.11 Despite these drug cost containment strategies, recent
studies of this global budgeting system show that hospitals in-
creased their use of drugs after its implementation.6,11–13 It
remains unclear, however, whether the size of the response
varies among hospitals with different owner types.
In Taiwan, public hospitals are managed by the government
directly, or by public enterprises or public universities. Each year
government funds are allocated to partially finance long-term
investments and operating expenditures of these hospitals. In
contrast, private for-profit (FP) hospitals are owned and operated
by physicians who are the residual claimants, while not-for-profit
(NFP) hospitals are owned by private universities, charitable
groups or groups funding medical research and are subject to a
non-distribution constraint.14 NFP hospitals enjoy substantial tax
advantages or exemptions from income, land and property
taxes, which FP hospitals do not. Further, most NFP hospitals are
financed by large charitable donations, while FP hospitals have
to be financed by non-tax-exempt personal debt and their operat-
ing profit.14
Studies in the USA suggest that FP hospitals have a stronger in-
centive to maximize cash flows than do NPF or public hospitals,15
that profit incentives affect physicians’ prescribing decisions16 and
that prescribing decisions in private hospitals, especially FP hospi-
tals, are more responsive than public hospitals to changes in fi-
nancial incentives.17,18 Similar behavior patterns have been
documented for hospitals in Taiwan.14,19 Consequently, we expect
that FP hospitals may respond more aggressively than NFP or
public hospitals to the incentives created by the global budget.
Further, the effect of ownership may vary among different
types of hospital department according to their reliance on
drugs to treat patients. In Taiwan, physicians are employed by
the hospital, and so we may in general expect their decisions to
be strongly influenced by hospital strategies adopted in response
to the global budgeting system. However, physicians in depart-
ments where drugs already form a large part of regular treatment,
such as those treating patients for hypertension, diabetes or
schizophrenia, may find it easier to increase drug use, by using
drugs more intensively or substituting them for non-drug treat-
ments.20 Conversely, physicians in departments relying more on
non-drug treatments for their standard care, for instance surgical
departments, may find that increasing the volume of non-drug
services is a more attractive means of increasing their share of
the global budget because monitoring of drug use by BNHI
makes substantial increases in drug treatments problematic.21
Therefore, we study in this paper the effect of the hospital
global budget by examining expenditure on drugs prescribed for
outpatients by departments within hospitals under different
types of ownership, before and after the implementation of the
global budget.
Methods
Conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates
the average impact of the global budget, but will obscure any het-
erogeneity in the relationship between department type and drug
use.22,23 Therefore, we estimate the policy’s effect using both OLS
and quantile regression, because quantile regression estimates
the marginal effect of an explanatory variable at a distinct point
of the conditional distribution; this allows us to explore the hetero-
geneous responses of different hospital departments (Table 1)
to the global budget with respect to their reliance on drug
treatments.22,23
Table 1. Taiwan hospital departments during the study period
(1997–2006)
Department Frequency (%)
Primary care 19 804 (5.69)
Internal medicine 43 778 (12.57)
Surgery 38 579 (11.08)
Pediatrics 20 965 (6.02)
Obstetrics and gynecology 27 236 (7.82)
Orthopedics 28 918 (8.31)
Neurosurgery 11 647 (3.34)
Urology 19 034 (5.47)
Ear, nose and throat (ENT) 16 646 (4.78)
Ophthalmology 18 995 (5.46)
Dermatology 15 519 (4.46)
Neurology 14 895 (4.28)
Psychiatrics 17 510 (5.03)
Gastrointestinal 10 630 (3.05)
Cardiovascular 11 260 (3.23)
Thoracic 10 143 (2.91)
Renal 9148 (2.63)
Rheumatoid immune branch 5402 (1.55)
Endocrinology 8062 (2.32)
Other 22 (0.01)
Total 348 193 (100.00)
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We use Koenker and Bassett’s estimator,22,23 as implemented
in the Stata 12 statistical package (StataCorp LP, College Station,
TX, USA) with the command ^qreg^,24,25 in the quantile regres-
sions. Our specification is:
Yhjkt = a+ b1GBt + b2 GBt ∗ FPh( ) + b3 GBt ∗ NFPh( )
+ b4FPh + b5NFPh + b6 GBt ∗ Chronichjt
( )
+ b7Chronichjt
+ H′htB + D
′
hjtB1 + b8PVkt + b9Mt + gj + dk + tt + 1hjkt,
where Yjt is the log of the average drug expenditure per outpatient
claim in hospital department j in month t (in 1996 New Taiwan
dollars, NT$); GBt is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all
months after June 2002; FPh and NFPh are dummy variables iden-
tifying FP and NFP hospitals, respectively (with public hospitals
serving as the reference group); Chronichjt is the proportion of
patients treated by a hospital department for a chronic (long-
term) condition, i.e. one of the 95 chronic illnesses (e.g. hyperten-
sion, diabetes or schizophrenia) included on a list published by the
Taiwan National Health Bureau.
Hht is a vector of hospital characteristics variables; Dhjt is a
vector of hospital department characteristics; PVkt is the regional
(ex post) point value; Mt is a monthly trend term; and gj, dk and tt
are fixed effects for the hospital department’s type, its hospital re-
imbursement region and the year, respectively.
The coefficient of GBt measures the average response of a hos-
pital department to the global budgeting system. Since hospitals
of different ownership types may react differently, we include two
interaction terms: GBt
*FPh and GBt
*NFPh; their coefficients (b2 and
b3) represent, relative to public hospitals, the additional response
of FP and NFP hospitals. We also include the interaction term GBt
*-
Chronichjt, because treatments for chronic illnesses consist largely
of drug prescriptions and physicians in departments with a higher
proportion of patients with a chronic condition are therefore more
likely to respond to the incentive provided by the global budget.12
(In our sample, the ratio of drug expenditures to total expendi-
tures for patients with a chronic illness is on average 40 percent-
age points higher than the ratio for patients who do not have a
chronic condition.)
The hospital characteristics vector Hht includes variables to
control for accreditation level and bed size. Accreditation categor-
ies include: major teaching hospitals (the reference group), minor
teaching hospitals, community hospitals and non-accredited
community hospitals.
Major teaching hospitals may be more concerned to maintain
or increase their perceived reputation for providing higher quality
care than other hospitals. Consequently, they may prefer to pre-
scribe more-expensive branded drugs, which are generally per-
ceived as of higher quality than generic drugs.19,26 Hospital size
is measured by the number of beds.
The hospital department characteristics vector Dhjt includes
patient characteristic variables: patient age, percent male,
percent chronically ill, the proportion of cases diagnosed as dia-
betes, as hypertension, as arthritis, as heart disease or as psychi-
atric illness. To mitigate concerns about the possible effects of
correlation between current and past drug expenditures, we
included the log of average drug expenditures in the preceding
month.
The variable PVkt reflects the discount applied to non-drug
reimbursements. This variable equals 1 for all regions in the quar-
ters preceding the imposition of the global budget. The variable Mt
is a monthly trend variable, included to control for common
shocks across all departments at the monthly level.
Finally, the estimation includes several levels of fixed effects.
Year fixed effects, tt, capture time-related market-wide effects
that may alter drug use by all hospital departments, for
example, nationwide drug cost containment policies implemen-
ted by the BNHI, or the general adoption of new drugs or tech-
nologies. Department fixed effects, gj, are included to control for
time-invariant differences in prescribing behavior across different
types of departments. Regional fixed effects, dk, are included to
control for the NHI administrative region in which a hospital is
located.
Sample and data
Our dependent variable is the average drug expenditure per out-
patient visit by a hospital department in a given month. Drug ex-
penditure is calculated from data in the NHI Database, which
includes claims for healthcare use by all NHI enrollees in Taiwan
each year (virtually the entire population). Each claim includes in-
formation on the patient’s diagnoses, case-type (e.g. emergency
or outpatient surgery), and dates of treatment, and on the hos-
pital departments that provided the services. In addition, the out-
patient claim includes detailed records of reimbursement, such as
drug, diagnosis and examination,15 and a hospital identifier that
allows us to link hospital basic files to obtain a hospital’s accredit-
ation, ownership status and zip-code.
Our data are derived from the 2005 NHI 1 million sample,
which is a random sample of 1 million NHI enrollees, roughly
5% of the Taiwan population, from the 2005 eligibility files. All out-
patient claims for these 1 million enrollees between January 1997
and June 2006 were obtained. We restricted our attention to out-
patient visits because drugs are the principal means for treating
outpatients in hospitals, and because expenditures on inpatient
care may vary widely if, for example, expensive equipment is
used in treatment. Focusing on outpatients thus reduces hetero-
geneity in the cost of patient care that is unrelated to doctors’ pre-
scribing behavior.
We also excluded all claims for: 1. services provided by local
clinics or in the form of Chinese medicine or for dental care; as
noted above, these are covered by different global budgets than
that covering Western-medicine hospitals; 2. dialysis and surger-
ies performed at outpatient visits because, as for drug expendi-
tures, these services are reimbursed at face value; 3. treatments
for patients that had zero co-payments (low-income patients),
because behaviors of these patients are likely to differ significantly
from those of the average patient.
Finally, the individual patient claims were condensed to the
monthly hospital-department level. In total, we have 348 193
observations of the average drug expenditures on outpatients at
a department in a hospital in a given month from January 1997
through June 2006. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for
the dependent variable before and after the global budgeting
system was adopted and for the independent variables described
above. In Table 3, we show how the control variables vary by hos-
pital ownership.
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Table 4 reports the results of estimating the specification using
OLS (column 1) and the quantile regression results for the 10th,
25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles. Standard errors (reported
in parentheses) are bootstrapped and clustered at the hospital
level.27–29
Examination of the second row of Table 4 shows that the
impact of the global budget in FP hospital departments relative
to public hospital departments is positive and significant at all
but the lowest percentiles, and that the magnitude rises across
the percentiles. These results indicate that, relative to public hos-
pitals, departments in FP hospitals were more likely to increase
drug expenditures after the imposition of the global budget,
with the positive response being larger as they relied more on
drug treatments (i.e. as we move to the right of the conditional
distribution of the dependent variable).
NFP hospital departments also increased their drug expendi-
tures relative to public hospital departments, but there is less evi-
dence of significant heterogeneity among departments in the
response. Interestingly, these results also show a ‘crossover’; at
the two lowest quantiles, the relative impact of the global
budget is actually greater in NFP than in FP hospital departments.
This may be evidence that FP hospitals put greater emphasis on
increasing non-drug treatments in departments where the result-
ing payoff might be larger; that is, where drugs are not much used
in treatment.13 In sum, these results indicate differences in strat-
egies among hospitals with different types of owners, suggesting
that FP hospitals responded more aggressively than NFP and espe-
cially public hospitals to the incentives created by the special
treatment of drug reimbursements within the global budget, par-
ticularly in those departments most reliant on drug treatments.
Interestingly, the effect of the global budget on public hospital
departments treating non-chronic patients (b1) shows that these
departments decreased drug expenditures, perhaps as part of a
general attempt to cut costs.
Finally, the estimated coefficient for the owner-type variable FP
shows that the general effect over the whole time period of FP
ownership was to reduce departmental drug expenditures relative
to those of public hospital departments, particularly at the higher
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables included in
quantile regressions in a study to identify the effect of the




Average drug expenditure per hospital
department visit (1996 NT$a)
January 1997–June 2002 385.0 351.4
July 2002–June 2006 493.4 936.2
Explanatory variables







Major teaching hospitalc 9.8 29.7
Minor teaching hospital 32.4 46.8
Community hospital 57.7 49.4
Non-accredited hospital 0.1 3.6
Hospital size (100s of beds)
Total beds 4.7 5.6
Health service region (%)
Region 1d 26.5 44.2
Region 2 14.7 35.4
Region 3 0.0 0.0
Region 4 21.1 40.8
Region 5 15.1 35.8
Region 6 18.1 38.5
Patient characteristics
Age (years) 45.5 13.9
Proportion with chronic disorders (%) 58.9 31.7
Proportion male (%) 44.0 22.1
Proportion with diabetes (%) 4.8 11.5
Proportion with arthritis (%) 5.4 14.1
Proportion with heart disease (%) 3.4 10.9

















Sample size (n) 348193
NT$: New Taiwan dollars.
a In 1996,1 NT$¼0.0364 US$, annual per capita income in
Taiwan¼NT$338 582 or US$12 330.
b Reference group among the hospital ownership categories.
c Reference group among the hospital accreditation categories.
d Reference group among the regions.
e Reference group among the years.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables for hospitals in Taiwan during 1997–2006, in a study to identify the effect of the
hospital global budget on drug expenditures
FP hospitals NFP hospitals Public hospitals
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent variable
Average drug expenditure per hospital department visit (1996 NT$)
January 1997–June 2002 253.0 252.1 497.2 373.1 470.0 358.3
July 2002–June 2006 352.3 390.0 603.4 479.0 521.1 411.0
Explanatory variables
Point value of global budget 0.95 0.07 0.95 0.07 0.95 0.07
Hospital characteristics
Hospital accreditation (%)
Major teaching hospitala 0.0 0.0 20.5 40.4 13.1 33.8
Minor teaching hospital 14.8 35.5 44.7 49.7 45.4 49.8
Community hospital 84.9 35.8 34.7 47.6 41.5 49.3
Non-accredited hospital 0.3 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hospital size (100s of beds)
Total beds 1.8 2.1 6.7 6.2 5.8 5.5
Health service region (%)
Region 1b 15.0 35.7 38.3 48.6 31.4 46.4
Region 2 19.1 39.3 10.1 30.1 13.1 33.8
Region 3 31.6 46.5 13.2 33.9 13.9 34.6
Region 4 12.0 32.5 17.4 37.9 17.4 37.9
Region 5 22.2 41.6 12.2 32.7 18.2 38.6
Region 6 0.1 3.7 8.8 28.4 6.0 23.8
Patient characteristics
Age (years) 43.9 13.8 46.4 13.5 47.1 14.0
Proportion with chronic disorders (%) 71.0 29.6 51.0 30.1 49.3 30.3
Proportion male (%) 44.4 23.7 43.2 19.4 44.2 22.3
Proportion with diabetes (%) 4.0 10.1 5.2 12.6 5.7 12.2
Proportion with hypertension (%) 6.5 13.4 7.9 15.5 8.5 15.8
Proportion with arthritis (%) 4.6 12.3 5.2 13.8 6.8 16.4
Proportion with heart disease (%) 3.0 10.2 3.4 11.2 3.8 11.3
Proportion with psychological disorders (%) 4.6 15.5 6.4 18.8 8.8 23.4
Time effects (%)
1997a 7.9 26.9 5.9 23.6 7.4 26.1
1998 8.8 28.4 7.4 26.1 8.6 28.0
1999 9.7 29.5 8.7 28.2 9.8 29.7
2000 9.9 29.9 9.0 28.5 9.7 29.5
2001 10.4 30.6 10.2 30.2 10.7 30.9
2002 10.5 30.6 10.8 31.1 11.0 31.3
2003 10.6 30.8 11.2 31.5 11.1 31.4
2004 11.0 31.3 11.8 32.3 10.2 30.2
2005 10.8 31.0 12.2 32.8 10.7 30.9
2006 10.3 30.5 12.8 33.4 10.9 31.2
Sample size (n) 146 198 101 117 100 878
FP: for-profit; NFP; not-for-profit; NT$: New Taiwan dollars.
a Reference group among the hospital accreditation categories.
b Reference group among the health service regions.
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percentiles, presumably because the presence of a residual claim-
ant may have caused these departments to try harder to reduce
their costs. Private NFP hospitals, on the other hand, tended to
spend more than public hospitals, most significantly in the lower
percentiles.
We also conducted interquartile tests using Stata code ^iqreg^
to check whether differences across the quantiles are significant.
Table 5 displays the results of interquartile tests. We found
that while there are no significant differences in the coefficients
of variable of interest across quantiles below the median, the dif-
ferences between quartiles above the median are statistically
significant.
Sensitivity tests
We performed two sensitivity tests. First, we added seasonal
dummies in addition to the monthly trend and the year fixed
effects variables in case there were regularities in drug expendi-
tures associated with seasonal conditions such as the weather.
Inclusion of these variables did not affect our results. Second,
we re-ran our specification excluding departments for which
there were fewer than 30 observations (i.e. departments that
we observed in the data set for fewer than 10 quarters) in case
the behavior of newly entered departments or exiting depart-
ments biased our results. Again, we found that our main results
were not affected by this exclusion although we did find that
the exclusion of these short-lived departments reduced the size
and significance of the response to the global budget by depart-
ments in NFP hospitals. (Results with seasonal variables and
with departments with fewer than 30 observations excluded are
available on request.)
Discussion
We used quantile regression to study the impact of Taiwan’s
global budgeting system on the drug expenditures of hospital
departments in hospitals with different types of owner. While
we find, as in other studies, that the overall response of
hospital departments to the global budget was to increase drug
expenditures, we also find significant heterogeneity in depart-
mental responses. Departments within FP hospitals show small
or insignificant increases in drug expenditures by low quartile
departments and increasing expenditures by high quartile
departments; NFP hospital departments also show increases at
all percentiles, but with much less variation in their response.
Public hospital departments, by contrast, show large positive
increases in the lowest percentile departments, with the effect
disappearing by the 75th percentile. Our results suggest that
both owner type and department type influence the change in
drug use that followed implementation of the global budgeting
system.
A limitation of this study is that we are uncertain as to exactly
how the changes in expenditure are affecting patient care and
outcomes. For example, while we observe that FP hospitals
increased drug expenditures in high percentile departments, we
cannot be sure whether the drug expenditures are increasing
because more drugs are being prescribed than in the past for
the same condition, or because of an increase in the use of
drugs instead of non-drug treatments. Further, we have not inves-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































global budgeting system. These questions are important and
deserve additional study.
Conclusion
Government-provided healthcare programs are likely to continue
to experience financial pressure, and a global budgeting system
may be an effective means of managing expenditures. However,
the details of such a system must be carefully designed to avoid
giving healthcare providers incentives to behave in ways that
undermine cost containment goals or the quality of patient
care. Our findings suggest that all healthcare providers altered
medical treatments in response to imposition of the global
budget. However, given that use of drugs was likely also influ-
enced by the previous reimbursement system, it is impossible to
say which change may have improved health care or made it
worse. More research is needed to determine whether these
very different responses had significant impacts on the quality
of health outcomes for the patients affected.
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